

take of the conversation that ultimately gives "place and character to every human activity and utterance." Education—the conversation—is the place where one comes to learn what it is to be a person.

Cast in that light, the seriousness of Martin's charge is obvious: if the conversation, this discourse stretching back to the primeval forest, is the place in which personhood is defined, to exclude women, or any group for that matter, from the conversation is to deny members of that group the right to become persons. It is to treat them as something less than human.

Finally, if the educational conversation is like more prosaic ones, it will depend for energy and vivacity on a multiplicity of perspectives and a diversity of voices. In ordinary conversations, if we all see things from the same vantage point, if we all look and sound and think alike, eventually the conversation will wind down to where we say the same old things in the same old ways, where, rather than learning from one another, we simply reaffirm our beliefs. As much as she is talking about who should have a voice in the conversation, Martin is talking about the health of the educational conversation itself.

NOTE

1. Michael Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays* (London: Methuen, 1962), p. 199.

From *Reclaiming a Conversation: The Ideal of the Educated Woman* (1985)

Contemporary philosophers of education ignore the subject of women. In the technical writings of the academy, as in popular polemical works, questions of gender simply do not arise. These theorists analyze the concept of education, discuss the nature and structure of liberal education, construct theories of teaching and learning, set forth criteria of excellence, and debate educational aims and methods without attending to the difference of sex. It has not always been this way. Plato—perhaps the first systematic one—wrote specifically about Western thought and certainly the greatest educational philosopher in the history of the education of females. So did Jean-Jacques Rousseau, one of the few Western philosophers whose educational thought rivals Plato's both in its depth of understanding and in its far-reaching influence. Indeed, throughout Western history both men and women have taken the subject of women's education sufficiently seriously to have written countless treatises about it.

From *Reclaiming a Conversation: The Ideal of the Educated Woman* by Jane Roland Martin (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, © 1985 by Jane Roland Martin), pp. 1-7, 178-199. Reprinted by permission of Yale University Press.

The question arises, then, why educational theorists in our day take no notice of gender and why feminist theorists, in their turn, pay so little attention to questions of educational philosophy. Studies of sex differences in learning and sex bias in educational practices abound, research in the history of women's education flourishes, discussions of feminist pedagogy are numerous, and debates on the best way to incorporate the study of women into the liberal curriculum are commonplace. An examination of educational ideals, however, is seldom found in contemporary literature on women, and the construction of an adequate philosophy of women's education is rarely seen as relevant to the task of developing a comprehensive feminist theory.¹

Feminist theory has not always been divorced from educational philosophy. Mary Wollstonecraft's *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792) is a treatise both on woman's place and on woman's education, and Charlotte Perkins Gilman's utopian novel *Herland* (1915) joins a well-developed theory of education to a feminist social vision. But that women now are receiving an education very much like the one Wollstonecraft urged for her daughters does not mean it is the one women *should* be receiving. Indeed, as Adrienne Rich, one of the few contemporary feminists who has written incisively and evocatively on the education of women, has pointed out, that women continue to *receive* an education is itself a matter of concern.

Addressing a group of female college students in 1977, Rich asked them to think of themselves as *claiming* rather than *receiving* an education. The difference between the two verbs is the difference between acting and being acted upon, she said,² and for women it can literally mean the difference between life and death.³ Why is passivity toward learning a potentially fatal attitude? Rich was not merely echoing the psychologists who tell us that learning must be active if it is to be effective, although she might well accept the validity of the argument. Perceiving the extent to which education can promote or stunt women's growth and development, Rich grounded her thesis on a feminist vision of what women's lives can and should be. She was saying that in becoming mere receptacles for a university learning that excludes their experience and thought, women's lives can be damaged beyond repair.

Rich urged her audience to take charge not just of the manner in which they learn but of the content of their learning: "What you can learn here (and I mean not only at Douglass but any college in any university) is how *men* have perceived and organized their experience, their history, their ideas about social relationships, good and evil, sickness and health, etc. When you read or hear about 'great issues,' 'major texts,' 'the mainstream of Western thought,' you are

¹ I realize that although individual feminist thinkers have tended to neglect questions of educational philosophy, the women's studies movement is directly concerned with just such issues. The extent to which this movement has explored alternative educational *ideals* is a question that requires further investigation.

² Adrienne Rich, "Claiming an Education," in *On Lies, Secrets and Silence* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1979), p. 231.

hearing about what men, above all white men, in their male subjectivity, have decided is important.³ She might have added that one should not expect to find included among those great issues or in the major texts her topic—the education of women. For although conversation on women's education began centuries before the birth of Christ and has continued into the present time, it has simply been ignored by the standard texts and anthologies in the history of educational thought.⁴

Does it matter that this conversation over time and space is missing? If females today have access to the same education as males—and in the United States to a great extent they do—what difference does it make that historians of educational thought neglect the topic of women, that Plato's, Rousseau's, Wollstonecraft's, and Gilman's discussions of women's education have not been incorporated into the mainstream of Western thought? Does the discovery in educational history of epistemological inequality—by which I mean inequality in knowledge itself in this instance, in the representation of women in historical narratives and philosophical interpretations—have any practical significance for those who would follow Rich's advice and claim an education for and about themselves?⁵

Since the early 1970s research has documented the ways in which such intellectual disciplines as history and psychology, literature and the fine arts, sociology and biology are biased according to sex.⁶ This work has revealed that on at least three counts the disciplines fall short of the ideal of epistemological equality for women: they exclude women from their subject matter, distort the female according to the male image of her, and deny value to characteristics the society considers feminine. When a discipline does not meet the standard of epistemological equality, not only women but the tasks and functions society associates with them are denigrated. The problem is compounded when the history of educational thought falls short of this ideal because so many parties to the ongoing conversation about female education are women.

To the extent that the major historical texts overlook Plato's female guardians and Rousseau's Sophie, women's lives and experiences are devalued. When the voices of Wollstonecraft and Gilman are unrecorded, students are denied contact with some of the great female minds of the past; the implicit message

³ *Ibid.*, p. 232.

⁴ Jane Roland Martin, "Excluding Women from the Educational Realm," *Harvard Educational Review* 52 (1982):133-48.

⁵ To say that a discipline such as the history of educational thought has not achieved epistemological equality is to comment on the nature of the knowledge produced by that discipline, not on the nature of practitioners of the discipline and not on, for example, the hiring practices within the profession.

⁶ This new scholarship on women is too extensive to be cited in its entirety here. For reviews of it, see the journal *Signs*. See also anthologies such as Julia A. Sherman and Evelyn Torton Beck, eds., *The Prison of Sex* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979); Elizabeth Langland and Walter Gove, eds., *A Feminist Perspective in the Academy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka, eds., *Discovering Reality* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1983).

is that women have never thought systematically about education, that indeed, they may be incapable of serious philosophical reflection on the topic.

I do not mean to suggest that every female educational theorist has been interested primarily in the education of her own sex. Maria Montessori is a notable example of a woman who developed a philosophy of education without reference to sex or gender. Yet many women have focused on female education. For example, with *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* Mary Wollstonecraft entered the ongoing conversation by questioning Rousseau's theory of the education of girls and women and presenting one of her own. She, in turn, was influenced by the contribution Catherine Macaulay had made to this conversation in her *Letters on Education* (1790). In numerous books and articles written at a later date in another country, Catharine Beecher set forth a philosophy of the education of girls and women that presents interesting contrasts to Wollstonecraft's. And Beecher's grandniece, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, wove into her utopian novel, *Herland*, her educational philosophy for women.

Although these theorists of female education were well known in their own day, it is likely that until recently even Wollstonecraft's name would have been unfamiliar to historians of educational thought. I am able to cite them here because contemporary research on women is in the process of recovering the lives and works of so many who had been lost to history. Yet even if blame does not attach to the authors of the texts that silence women's voices, the fate of the contributions of Plato and Rousseau suggests that had the writings on female education of Macaulay, Wollstonecraft, Beecher, and Gilman been known to exist, they too would have been ignored.

The devaluation of women is not the only unhappy consequence of the exclusion from the history of educational thought of all conversation about female education. The noted philosopher of education Israel Scheffler has said that the function of philosophy is to enlighten policy "by pressing its traditional questions of value, virtue, veracity, and validity."⁷ These questions need to be pressed in relation to policies concerning the education of girls and women; yet as long as the conversation to which they belong is considered to fall outside the province of philosophy, they cannot be.

In inviting students to take responsibility for their own education, Rich beseeched them to reject those models of feminine weakness, self-denial, and subservience the culture holds up to them:

Responsibility to yourself means that you don't fall for shallow and easy solutions—predigested books and ideas, weekend encounters guaranteed to change your life, taking 'gut' courses instead of ones you know will challenge you, bluffing at school and life instead of doing solid work, marrying early as an escape from real decisions, getting pregnant as an evasion of already existing problems. It means that you refuse to

⁷ Israel Scheffler, "Philosophy of Education: Some Recent Contributions," *Harvard Educational Review* 50 (1980):402-06.

sell your talents and aspirations short, simply to avoid conflict and confrontation. And this, in turn, means resisting forces in society which say that women should be nice, play safe, have low professional expectations, drown in love and forget about work, live through others, and stay in the places assigned to us.⁸

Every woman has felt the pull of one or more of these negative models. She who is not attracted to the ideal of the self-denying wife and mother may become a woman who denies her intelligence; she who disdains the ideal of silent passivity may find the model of "the slapdash dilettante who never commits herself to anything the whole way" irresistible. Each of us will see mother or daughter, sister or friend, if not oneself, represented on Rich's list. Unfortunately, if a woman does what Rich asks—if she takes responsibility for her own education—she will find herself at a disadvantage. How can a woman avoid shallow solutions to the problems education poses if she never hears what has been said by those who have thought deeply on the subject? How can she know what education to claim if she has never entered into philosophical conversation about this education herself, indeed never even realized that such conversation existed?

Not only women are led astray in this circumstance; men also suffer when they are denied knowledge of the range of educational ideals past philosophers have held up for half the population. In *A Viridication* Wollstonecraft makes clear the disastrous consequences for the man, Emile, of the faulty education Rousseau designs for Sophie. Sophie's case can be generalized. So long as men and women inhabit the same society and live overlapping lives, each sex will be affected by the education of the other. Unenlightened policies of female education will inevitably rebound on males.

There is another reason men suffer when past conversation about women's education is ignored. Historians of educational thought are not antiquarians whose sole concern is to preserve the ideas of the past. They justify their inquiries by reference to the insights into contemporary education yielded by a study of past philosophies. "Philosophy, unlike the sciences, never fully outgrows its history," says Schefler. "The arguments and conceptions of past thinkers retain a fundamental relevance for contemporary philosophy even as it struggles to find new ways for itself."⁹ Historical study, then, illuminates educational practice today and guides the development, clarification, and testing of new theories about what education should be.¹¹

⁸ Rich, "Claiming an Education," pp. 233-34.

⁹ Dale Spender says: "While men take it for granted that they can build on what has gone before, selecting, refining, adapting the knowledge they have inherited to meet their needs, women are constantly required to begin with a blank sheet" (*Invisible Women: The Schooling Scandal* [London: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative Society, 1982], p. 17).

¹⁰ Israel Schefler, Preface to *Three Historical Philosophies of Education*, by William F. Frankena (Chicago: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1965).

¹¹ Paul Nash, *Models of Man* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968), p. vii; Henry J. Perkinson, *Since Socrates: Studies in the History of Western Educational Thought* (New York: Longman, 1980), p. xi.

How much illumination can be shed on the education of boys and men by a historical narrative that ignores girls and women? Philosophers do not construct theories of education in a vacuum. Viewing education as preparation for carrying on societal roles, they tie their proposals to some vision of the good society. And insofar as the society the philosopher pictures is peopled by both sexes, we cannot evaluate the educational ideal it holds up for males unless we know its expectations for females. We will not even know the right questions to ask. Do men and women in the envisioned society have reciprocal roles, with men carrying out the functions of citizenship and women those of domesticity? If so, we must ask not only if the education claimed for males will equip them to be good citizens but also if it will promote or frustrate the efforts of women to perform their own functions effectively. Alternatively, do men and women in this society share roles and the tasks and functions associated with them? If so, we must ask if the full complement of significant social roles is reflected in the education claimed for both men and women.

When history neglects past philosophical conversations about women's education, it follows that the tasks, functions, institutions, and traits of character that philosophy, as a part of our culture, has associated with women are neglected. Discussions about marriage, home, family are missing as are discussions about society's reproductive processes—a category I define broadly to include not simply conception and birth but the rearing of children to more or less maturity and associated activities such as tending the sick, taking care of family needs, and running a household.

We look to the history of educational thought for guidance. Because its narrative does not record conversation about female education, it is implied that the only valid questions about education have to do with its adequacy as preparation for citizenship and the workplace.¹² No one would deny the importance of education for society's productive processes—in which category I include political and cultural activities as well as economic ones—but other tasks and functions are just as compelling. In the United States in the late twentieth century, we may reject a sex-based division of labor, but we must not forget that many of the tasks and functions that have traditionally been assigned to women are essential to the existence of society and must be carried on well if we are to have any chance of creating a better world.¹³

The statistics on child abuse and domestic violence in our society today¹⁴ belie the assumption that the knowledge, skills, attitudes, and traits of character

¹² Recent reports on American education reflect this same focus. See, for example, Mortimer J. Adler, *The Paideia Proposal* (New York: Macmillan, 1982); Ernest L. Boyer, *High School* (New York: Harper & Row, 1983); John I. Goodlad, *A Place Called School* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1984); Theodore R.Sizer, *Horace's Compromise* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1984).

¹³ For more on the distinction between productive and reproductive societal processes, see Lorenne Clark, "The Rights of Women: The Theory and Practice of the Ideology of Male Supremacy," in *Contemporary Issues in Political Philosophy*, ed. William R. Shea and John King-Farlow (New York: Science History Publications, 1976), pp. 49-65.

¹⁴ For a thorough discussion of these topics, see Wini Breines and Linda Gordon, "The New Scholarship on Family Violence," *Signs* 8 (1983):495-507.

necessary for effectively carrying out the reproductive processes of society occur naturally in people. Education for these processes is not only as essential as education for society's productive processes but also has an overarching political, social, and moral significance. Jonathan Schell has said that "the nuclear penit makes all of us, whether we happen to have children of our own or not, the parents of all future generations"; he has called the will to save the human species a form of love resembling "the generative love of parents."¹⁵ A historical narrative that neglects conversation about the education of women has little, if anything, to say about this kind of love and cannot serve either sex well.

Men and women need to claim the best possible education for themselves and their sons and daughters. All must listen to and participate in conversation about the ideals governing the education of both sexes. Only then will we understand that the education most of us receive today is too narrow. Only then can we begin to construct theories of education that give the reproductive as well as the productive processes of society their due, and only then can we press our questions of "value, virtue, veracity, and validity" in relation to the whole range of educational concerns. Is education for rearing children and caring for home and family desirable? If so, for whom? Should this education be placed on a par with citizenship education and become a universal requirement or should it be considered a specialty? If it is a specialty, does it properly belong to vocational or professional education? These are a few of the submerged questions that rise to the surface when conversation about women's education is incorporated into public learning.

REDEFINING THE EDUCATIONAL REALM

The larger effort of reclamation—even the conversation reclaimed here—has important implications for the content, methodology, and structure of the history of educational thought. Earlier I raised the question of why this discipline has censored conversation about the education of half the world's population. Now that we know the subject matter of that conversation, we are in a position to answer the question. We have heard Plato, Rousseau, Wollstonecraft, Beecher, and Gilman repeatedly discuss marriage, home, family, child rearing, and domestic management. Of course, they also addressed political and economic issues, but no matter what sort of education our five philosophers were claiming for women, they could not ignore the reproductive processes of society and their associated traits, tasks, functions, and institutions. Historians of educational thought consider these topics to be none of their concern, however.

Loreanne Clark has shown that from the standpoint of political theory the consignment of women, children, and the family to the ontological basement—that is, their apolitical status—is due not to historical accident or necessity but

to arbitrary definition.¹⁶ The reproductive processes of society, broadly interpreted to include the rearing of children to more or less independence, are excluded by fiat from the political domain, which is defined in relation to the world of productive processes—political, social, and cultural as well as economic. Since the subject matter of political theory is politics, and since the reproductive processes have traditionally been assigned to women and have taken place within the family, it follows that women and the family are excluded from the subject matter of the discipline.

The analogy between political theory and educational thought is striking. Despite the fact that the reproductive processes of society, broadly understood, are largely devoted to child rearing and include the transmission of skills, beliefs, feelings, emotions, values, and even world views, they are not considered to belong to the educational realm. Thus education, like politics, is defined in relation to the productive processes of society, and the status of women and the family is every bit as "a-educational" as it is apolitical. No wonder Sophie is overlooked by historians of educational thought. Unless the borders of the educational realm are altered, Emily, Sarah, and Ellador will be, too.

To be sure, the education Plato prescribes for his female guardians is designed to equip them to carry on that most important productive process, ruling. If my explanation of the way the history of educational thought defines its subject matter is correct, why is the education of these women neglected by the field? Two reasons come to mind. In the first place, Plato's female guardians constitute an anomaly for the field's definition of itself: productive processes fall within the educational realm; women fall outside it. One way to resolve the problem posed by Plato's women is to ignore them; another is to discuss their education but treat as irrelevant the fact that they are women. Furthermore, to understand and evaluate Plato's theory of female education, one must take into account his views on the institutions of private marriage, home, family, and child rearing. Since these fall outside the educational realm, it is easy enough to perceive the education of his female guardians as falling there, also.

If conversation about women's education is to be incorporated in the history of educational thought, the definition of that discipline's subject matter must be expanded to include the processes of society with which women's lives have historically been intertwined. If the conversational circle is to be enlarged and the discussion enriched, the methods of this field will also have to become more inclusive.

The five theories of female education reclaimed here were reconstructed from the pages of books. Although the last three of the works I have drawn on—*A Vindication*, *A Treatise*, *Herland*—are not part of the established canon of educational theory and philosophy, my approach has nonetheless been one of looking to books for data. Recall, however, that one of the books—*Herland*—

¹⁶ Loreanne M. G. Clark, "The Rights of Women: The Theory and Practice of the Ideology of Male Supremacy" in *Contemporary Issues in Political Philosophy*, ed. William R. Shea and John King-Farlow (New York: Science History Publications, 1976), pp. 49-65.

¹⁵ Jonathan Schell, *The Fate of the Earth* (New York: Avon, 1982), p. 175.

was originally published in serialized form in a popular magazine. Had it not been for Ann Lane's retrieval, *Herland*, independent of its subject matter, might have been considered a suspect source to use in the reconstruction of the history of educational thought. Thus if we are finally to be able to listen to the full range of our conversation, we will have to change our notion not only of what counts as a bona fide topic of study but also of what counts as a bona fide source of data.

The general expectation that any educational theory worth recording is readily accessible in books or academic journals becomes unreasonable when the objects or the subjects of educational thought are considered marginal. Marginal people do not normally have access to established channels of communication, and those channels rarely give equal time to topics concerning marginal people. Yet marginal is precisely what society has considered women to be. Thus, as the larger effort of reclamation proceeds, we will have to look to sources of data that the history of educational thought regards, as far from standard: to personal letters, diaries, pamphlets, newsletters, pieces of fiction, and to oral sources as well.

As our conception of sources is affected by the entrance of women into the educational realm, so too will be our conception of the discipline's techniques. Historians of educational thought are accustomed to having their philosophers and their sources handed to them ready-made—Dewey's *Democracy and Education*, Whitehead's *The Aims of Education*—so that the investigator's task is the relatively straightforward one of interpretation and evaluation. Occasionally a new work or a new thinker will be discovered and made a part of the canon. Occasionally a person's philosophical thought will be reconstructed from lecture notes rather than polished essays. It is rare, however, for a historian of educational thought to become a historian in the more primary sense of digging up the sources and, in the process, determining whether the author is indeed to be considered an educational philosopher. Yet this is precisely what will be required of those engaged in the larger reclamation effort concerning the education of women—on the one hand, if letters, pamphlets, and the like are even to serve as sources for a reconstructed conversation and, on the other, if we are to discover which individuals in our past have actually constructed theories of female education.

Even this way of putting the problem, however, is a function of present conceptions of methodology, in particular of what counts as an author or creator of an educational philosophy. It is normally assumed that the educational thought of the past worth preserving has been created by individuals. When the topic of study is women's education, this assumption too must be questioned.

Wollstonecraft, Beecher, Gilman: we must not be misled by the fact that these women wrote philosophical works into supposing that women in general have had access to the social, economic, and educational resources philosophy requires. The life stories of the three female participants in our conversation testify to the enormous difficulties even the most successful women have had to overcome in order to do the sort of intellectual labor reclaimed here. Although

our three are by no means the only women in history to have attained philosophical authorship in the field of education, we need to follow Wollstonecraft's lead, just as she refused to ground her case for women's rationality on the existence of the extraordinary women of her time, so we should refuse to ground our larger effort of reclamation on the existence of the relatively few extraordinary women—and those men—who have written extensively on female education. Rather, we must understand that some of the most interesting and significant theories of female education may have been authored not by single individuals but by groups of individuals—for instance, those founding and running schools—and others may have simply emerged out of social movements.

When our conception of authorship changes, historians of educational thought will have to take on the role of anthropologist, just as the reconstruction of Hopi ethics required the skills of both philosopher and anthropologist,¹⁷ so the reconstruction of the philosophy of education of a school or social movement may require the skills of these two professions and of the primary historian besides. The standard philosophical processes of analysis, criticism, interpretation, and evaluation will continue to be essential activities. Otherwise the very policies and practices whose "value, virtue, veracity, and validity" have never been enlightened by philosophy will continue to be denied this needed source of illumination. Nevertheless, when half of the world's population and with it the reproductive processes of society are admitted into the subject matter of a discipline, some very real methodological and substantive changes will occur. The extent of these changes cannot be predicted, but the shape and structure of the narrative of educational thought will undoubtedly be affected.

Once the absence of women from the standard texts and anthologies has been recognized, can we not simply add sections about female education to existing chapters on Plato and Rousseau and introduce new chapters on Wollstonecraft, Beecher, and Gilman? Whatever methodological adjustments may be required, are not revised editions all that we need?

The history of educational thought is no exception to the rule discovered by scholars in a wide range of fields that a simple additive solution to the problem of the inclusion of women will not work. Consider Sophie. As we have seen, it is not just that the accepted interpretation of Rousseau's thought does not mention her education. Sophie's education constitutes an anomaly for that interpretation since what Rousseau says about her stands in contradiction to it. Of course, it is possible to add a section about Sophie to a chapter on Rousseau, but the result will be unsatisfactory: Rousseau will be made to look the fool who spent the last hundred pages of *Emile* contradicting the first three hundred. And Rousseau was no fool. Moreover, the additive approach obscures the important fact that when book 5 of *Emile* is taken seriously, our reading of books 1-4 changes.

How tempting it is to think of women's entry into the educational realm as requiring, if not simply brief addenda to the history of educational thought, then at most the introduction of a second and separate narrative strand. Taking

¹⁷ Richard Brandt, *Hopi Ethics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

female education as its object of study, would not a second strand complement the already existing one, now acknowledged to constitute a narrative only of the education of males? The suggestion may sound promising, but the separate-strand approach to the history of educational thought is self-defeating: once the female narrative is constructed, the inadequacy of the original strand for even the limited task of tracing theories about the education of boys and men becomes apparent.

Again Sophie is a case in point. Since Rousseau ties her education so closely to her societal role, it is all but impossible to understand *Emile*, book 5, unless concepts like the ones employed in reclaiming the present conversation are introduced. Whether or not the interpretive framework ultimately adopted for Sophie's education is the one used here, it is necessary in capturing Rousseau's intent to introduce such notions as the wife-mother role, domesticity, the patriarchal family, and the reproductive processes of society, which have no place at all in the interpretations that currently constitute the history of educational thought. Home, family, marriage, children: the original narrative strand has nothing to say about such phenomena. Given a second narrative strand in which they figure prominently, the silences of the original narrative will become intolerable. If Sophie is educated for marriage to Emile, the question of his education for marriage to her inevitably arises. If she is educated to be his "other half," questions about the extent and nature of his self-sufficiency can no longer go unasked.

Sophie's case is instructive. Since we have seen in the conversation reclaimed here the standard interpretation of both Rousseau's and Plato's philosophies of education brought into question, the hypothesis that the inclusion of women in the educational realm will have little if any effect on the accepted narrative of the field lacks credibility. When it is understood that females can carry out the guardian duties to Plato's satisfaction only because he has stripped his guardian class of private home, marriage, and family and of all responsibility for the reproductive processes of society, the one-sidedness of the education he prescribes for the guardians is revealed. When his educational ideal of self-disciplined, self-contained individuals is juxtaposed with Gilman's ideal for mother love, the inadequacy of the Platonic scheme for achieving the communal feelings he believes to be essential for unity is exposed. From the examples of Plato and Rousseau one must conclude that those who listen to and engage in conversation about women's education can expect to find enlightenment not only about the education of females but also about that of males.

In a two-sex society it is to be expected that theories of male and female education are mutually illuminating. But the major reason for rejecting the two-strand approach is not that the theoretical separation of females and males keeps out badly needed light, although it does. The more important fault is its failure to recognize that in our two-sex society, educational theory and philosophy must place males and females in one world—a world in which the sexes live together interdependently. Only when Sophie and Emile are seen to be interdependent individuals and their education is interpreted in light of their relationship to each other is an adequate understanding of Rousseau's educational thought possible.

Only when the reproductive processes of society are seen to stand in relation to the productive ones is an adequate understanding of Plato's educational thought possible.

Of the parties to our conversation, both Plato and Rousseau understand that so long as the societies they envision contain males and females, the theories of education they construct will have to take both sexes into account. Rousseau, in particular, understands the importance of developing an educational theory that recognizes the ways in which the sexes interact. It is no accident that Sophie is educated for dependence: that is the relation in which she is supposed to stand to Emile. It is no accident that he is educated to be his own legislator: that is the relation in which he, as citizen, is supposed to stand to the state and he, as husband, is supposed to stand to Sophie. To be sure, if Emile is educated according to plan, he may not in fact acquire the loving qualities he must possess if his union with Sophie is to flourish. But this is because Rousseau is mistaken about what a harmonious marriage involves, not because he does not realize that males and females must be educated to live in the same world.

As a woman who had founded a highly successful female seminary, Beecher had ample justification for directing her attention specifically to the education of females. Yet it must not be forgotten that in Beecher's philosophy Sarah requires a husband who acknowledges her competence. Beecher's ideal society could perhaps incorporate legal sanctions to force men to give way to their wives in domestic affairs, but it certainly would run more smoothly and happily if, instead, the early education of males instilled in them a willingness to accept the judgment of professionals of both sexes.

Given her desire to extend the rights of men to women, Wollstonecraft also had good reason to develop a theory of female, not male, education. Yet her daughters require husbands who will treat them as equals in marriage and politics, and there is no reason to suppose that without reeducation the men they marry will do so. Of course, by extending to women the education she takes to be suitable for men, in *A Vindication* Wollstonecraft indirectly takes a stand on the education of males. But if she really wants to educate a new woman, she cannot realistically advocate the same old education for men. Just as Plato must reeducate his male guardians to respect and treat as equals the females he would educate to be rulers, so to transform the marriage relation and to add to women's traditional wife-mother role that of citizen, Wollstonecraft must reeducate her sons as well as her daughters.

Wollstonecraft is correct that Sophie is an artifact of society. What she fails to note is that Emile is socialized, too, and that so long as his socialization and formal education remain unchanged, the new educational program she constructs for Emile will be insufficient. Will men treat Emile as an equal citizen—will they, indeed, allow her to be a citizen—if they continue to believe that Sophie represents every woman? Will Emile be willing or able to reject Sophie if the man in her life continues to desire a toy rather than a friend and colleague? Will she derive the anticipated benefits from the male education extended to her if Sophie remains the norm in male eyes?

So long as Sophie represents the norm for femininity, Emily will be evaluated negatively for her rationality and independence.¹⁸ Thus even as Wollstonecraft educates her daughters to be citizens and rational wives-mothers, she must educate her sons to see Sophie as she does. She can hope that, because of their own rationality, without her intervention her Emiles will appreciate her Emilys once they get to know them, but she had best not count on their relinquishing voluntarily their monopoly in political affairs and their ultimate authority in marriage. For this end to be realized, Wollstonecraft's sons must come to see the world—and women in particular—differently. Even as Wollstonecraft extends men's formal education to women, she must change men's informal education so as to transform their consciousness.

Moreover, if men's *formal* education remains unchanged, Wollstonecraft's social and political program for women will not succeed. In extending to females the liberal education traditionally limited to males, Wollstonecraft makes the mistake Plato makes of initiating both sexes into cognitive perspectives according to which women are viewed as the Other, as beings defined and differentiated by reference to men.¹⁹ Surely the exclusion or distortion of the lives, works, and experiences of women from the subject matter of the theoretical disciplines is not a modern phenomenon. Philosophers did not begin portraying women as less rational than men in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. With few exceptions, Greek, medieval, Renaissance, and Enlightenment philosophies all contain a vision of women as creatures both alien and inferior. And until the past two decades historians have tended to overlook the accomplishments of individual women and to ignore entirely topics having to do specifically with female experience. Thus, unless Wollstonecraft takes measures to transform the content of the liberal education she extends to both males and females, there is little reason to expect the males to view the females as their equals in the state or in the home, or for that matter for the females to consider themselves their husbands' equals.

Beecher is guilty also of prescribing a liberal education for women in which they are either seen through male eyes or not seen at all. Gilman, as we know, gets around this problem by constructing a one-sex society in which women have created their own forms of knowledge. That she does not endow Herland with the ready-made disciplines of her own society suggests that she perceived their male biases. Furthermore, Gilman's treatment of the intrusion of the three American males, and especially her differentiation of the views of women held

¹⁸ Consider the following excerpts from interviews conducted in 1969-70 with members of the senior class of an Ivy League male college: "I enjoy talking to more intelligent girls, but I have no desire for a deep relationship with them. I guess I still believe that the man should be more intelligent." "I may be frightened of a man who is superior to me in some field of knowledge, but if a girl knows more than I do, I resent her" (Mirra Komarovsky, "Cultural Contradictions and Sex Roles: The Masculine Case," in *Changing Women in a Changing Society*, ed. Joan Huber (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 112.

¹⁹ Simone de Beauvoir, in *The Second Sex* (New York: Bantam, 1961), provides an extended discussion of woman as the Other.

by Terry, Jeff, and Van, indicate that she was well aware of both male socialization and the need for male reeducation. Still, Gilman does not provide us with a two-sex philosophy of education in which these insights are fully incorporated.

EDUCATING OUR SONS

"What do we want for our sons?" asks Adrienne Rich in *Of Woman Born*. "We want them to remain, in the deepest sense, sons of the mother, yet also to grow into themselves, to discover new ways of being men even as we are discovering new ways of being women."²⁰ If she could have one wish for her own sons, Rich continues, it is that they should have the courage of women: "I mean by this something very concrete and precise: the courage I have seen in women who, in their private and public lives, both in the interior world of their dreaming, thinking, and creating, and the outer world of patriarchy, are taking greater and greater risks, both psychic and physical, in the evolution of a new vision." (p. 215).

Rich's new vision includes the assimilation of males into a full-time, universal system of child care that would change not only the expectations of both sexes about gender roles but "the entire community's relationship to children." A latter-day Charlotte Perkins Gilman in her insistence that "the mother-child relationship is the essential human relationship" and simultaneously that "the myth that motherhood is 'private and personal' is the deadliest myth we have to destroy,"²¹ Rich makes clear the need men will have for "a kind of compensatory education in the things about which their education as males has left them illiterate."²²

The realm of illiteracy Rich has in mind is populated by the virtues of Sophie and Sarah: a well-developed capacity for sympathetic identification, a denial of the separation between love and work, a desire and an ability to nurture children. One need not adopt Rich's social vision—in which children are no longer "mine" and "thine," the mother-child relationship is placed at the very center of society, and child rearing is a universal responsibility—to agree that in the late twentieth century men should be claiming for themselves an education in Sophie's and Sarah's virtues as well as Emile's. Family living and child rearing are not today, if they ever were, solely in the hands of women. Males and females alike have responsibility for making the reproductive processes of society work well. Thus, men must claim an education that does justice to those processes even as they claim one that gives the productive processes their due.

The reproductive processes are of central importance to any society. It is no small matter, then, to insist that men as well as women be educated to carry them on. It would be a terrible mistake, however, to suppose that in our own society the virtues of Sophie and Sarah have no relevance beyond marriage,

²⁰ Adrienne Rich, *Of Woman Born* (New York: Bantam, 1977), p. 210.

²¹ Adrienne Rich, "The Contemporary Emergency and the Quantum Leap," in *On Lies, Secrets, and Silence* (New York: Norton, 1979), p. 271.

²² Rich, *Of Woman Born*, p. 216.

home, family, and child rearing. Ours is a country in which one out of four women is raped at some time in her life, one out of four girls and one out of ten boys is sexually abused before the age of eighteen, and some \$4-6 billion per year are grossed by the pornography industry.²³ Our country belongs to a world on the brink of nuclear and/or ecological disaster. Efforts to overcome these problems, as well as the related ones of poverty, economic scarcity, and racial injustice, flounder today under the direction of people who do not know how to sustain human relationships or respond directly to human needs, indeed, do not even see the value of trying to do so. We should not suppose that education can solve the world's problems. Yet if there is to be any hope of the continuation of life on earth, let alone of a good life for all, those who carry on society's productive processes must acquire the nurturing capacities and ethics of care Rousseau attributes to Sophie's nature.

Unfortunately, easy as it is to say that men's education must take Sophie and Sarah into account, and convincing as it may sound, our Platonic heritage stands between us and this goal. A case study of what almost everyone today would consider American education at its best reveals the extent to which Plato's educational vision persists in our own time and the damage it does.

In his educational autobiography *Hunger for Memory*, Richard Rodriguez tells of growing up in Sacramento, California, the third of four children in a Spanish-speaking family.²⁴ Upon entering first grade he could understand perhaps fifty English words. For half a year he resisted his teachers' demands that he speak English. When asked questions, he mumbled; otherwise he sat waiting for the bell to ring. One Saturday morning three nuns descended upon his house: "Do your children speak only Spanish at home?" they asked his mother. "Is it possible for you and your husband to encourage your children to practice their English when they are at home?" In an instant, Rodriguez's parents agreed, in his words, "to give up the language (the sounds) that had revealed and accentuated our family's closeness." An astounding resolve, but it bore fruit. Within a year Rodriguez was a fluent speaker of English; a short while later he graduated from elementary school with citations galore and entered high school having read hundreds of books; he next attended Stanford University; and, twenty years after the nuns' visit, he sat in the British Museum working on a Ph.D. dissertation in English literature.

Rodriguez, having learned to speak English, went on to acquire a liberal education in history, literature, science, mathematics, philosophy. His is a story of the cultural assimilation of a Mexican-American, but it is more than this, for by no means do all assimilated Americans conform to our image of a

well-educated person. Rodriguez does because, to use the terms philosopher R. S. Peters employs in his analysis of the concept of the educated man, he did not simply acquire knowledge and skill.²⁵ He acquired conceptual schemes to raise his knowledge beyond the level of a collection of disjointed facts and to enable him to understand the reason for things; moreover, the knowledge he acquired is not inert, but characterizes the way he looks at the world and involves the kind of commitment to the standards of evidence and canons of proof of the various disciplines that comes from "getting on the inside of a form of thought and awareness."

Quite a success story; yet *Hunger for Memory* is notable primarily for being a narrative of loss. In the process of becoming an educated man Rodriguez loses his fluency in Spanish, but that is the least of it. As soon as English becomes the language of the Rodriguez family, the special feeling of closeness at home is diminished. As his days are devoted more and more to understanding the meaning of words, it becomes increasingly difficult for Rodriguez to hear intimate family voices. When it is Spanish-speaking, his home is a noisy, playful, warm, emotionally charged environment; with the advent of English the atmosphere becomes quiet and restrained. There is no acrimony. The family remains rare, but the experience of "feeling individualized" by family members is now infrequent.

Thus, Rodriguez tells a story of alienation: from his parents, for whom he soon has no names; from the Spanish language, in which he loses his childhood fluency; from his Mexican roots, in which he loses interest; from his own feelings and emotions, which all but disappear in the process of his learning to control them; from his body itself, as he discovers when, after his senior year in college, he takes a construction job.

John Dewey spent his life trying to combat the tendency of educators to divorce mind from body and reason from emotion. Rodriguez's educational autobiography documents these divorces and another that Dewey deplored, that of self from other. *Hunger for Memory*, above all, depicts a journey from intimacy to isolation. Close ties with family members are dissolved as public anonymity replaces private attention. Rodriguez becomes a spectator in his own home as noise gives way to silence and connection to distance. School, says Rodriguez, bade him trust "lonely" reason primarily. And there is enough time and "silence," he adds, "to think about ideas (big ideas)."

What is the significance of this narrative of loss for those who want to claim the best possible education for their sons? Not every American has Rodriguez's good fortune of being born into a loving home filled with the warm sounds of intimacy; yet the separation and distance he ultimately experienced are by no means unique to him. On the contrary, they represent the natural end point of the educational journey Rodriguez took.

²³ R. S. Peters, *Ethics and Education* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966); "Education and the Educated Man" in *A Critique of Current Educational Aims*, ed. R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst, and R. S. Peters (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972).

²⁴ Allen Ginswald Johnson, "On the Prevalence of Rape in the United States," *Signs* 6 (1980):136-46; Bernice Lott, Mary Ellen Reilly, and Dale R. Howard, "Sexual Assault and Harassment: A Campus Community Case Study," *Signs* 8 (1982):296-319; Jack Thomas, "Subject: Child Abuse," *Boston Globe*, September 15, 1984, p. 18; "The Pornographic Industry," *Boston Globe*, February 13-18, 1983.

²⁵ Richard Rodriguez, *Hunger for Memory: The Education of Richard Rodriguez* (Boston: David B. Godine, 1982).

Dewey repeatedly pointed out that the distinction educators draw between liberal and vocational education represents a separation of mind from body, head from hand, thought from action. Since we define an educated person as one who has profited from a liberal education, these splits are built into our ideal of the educated person. Since most definitions of excellence in education derive from that ideal, these splits are built into them as well. A split between reason and emotion is built into our definitions of excellence, too, for we take the aim of a liberal education to be the development not of mind as a whole but of rational mind. We define this in terms of the acquisition of knowledge and understanding, construed very narrowly. It is not surprising that Rodriguez acquires habits of quiet reflection rather than noisy activity, reasoned deliberation rather than spontaneous reaction, dispassionate inquiry rather than emotional response, abstract analytic theorizing rather than concrete storytelling. These are integral to our ideal of the educated person, an ideal familiar to readers of the *Republic*.

Upon completion of his educational journey Rodriguez bears an uncanny resemblance to the guardians of the Just State. Granted, not one of Plato's guardians will be the "disembodied mind" Rodriguez says he became. Yet Plato designs for his guardians an education of heads, not hands. (Presumably the artisans of the Just State will serve as their hands.) Furthermore, holding up for the guardians an ideal of self-discipline and self-government he emphasizes inner harmony at the expense of outward connection. If his guardians do not begin their lives in intimacy, as Rodriguez did, their education, like his, is intended to confirm in them a sense of self in isolation from others.

Do the separations bequeathed to us by Plato matter? The great irony of the liberal education that comes down to us from Plato and still today is the mark of an educated man or woman is that it is neither tolerant nor generous. As Richard Rodriguez discovered, there is no place in it for education of the body, and since most action involves bodily movement, this means there is little room in it for education of action. Nor is there room for education of other-regarding feelings and emotions. The liberally educated man or woman will be provided with knowledge about others but will not be taught to care about their welfare or to act kindly toward them. That person will be given some understanding of society, but will not be taught to feel its injustices or even to be concerned over its fate. The liberally educated person will be an ivory-tower person—one who can reason but has no desire to solve real problems in the real world—or a technical person—one who likes to solve real problems but does not care about the solutions' consequences for real people and for the earth itself.

The case of Rodriguez illuminates several unhappy aspects of our Platonic heritage while concealing another. No one who has seen Fred Wiseman's film *High School* can forget the woman who reads to the assembled students a letter she has received from a pupil in Vietnam. But for a few teachers who cared, she tells her audience, Bob Walters, a subaverage student academically, "might have been a nobody." Instead, while awaiting a plane that is to drop him behind the DMZ, he has written her to say that he has made the school the beneficiary of his life insurance policy. "I am a little jittery right now," she reads. She

is not to worry about him, however, because "I am only a body doing a job." Measuring his worth as a human being by his monetary provision for the school, she overlooks the fact that Bob Walters was not merely participating in a war of dubious morality but was taking pride in being an automaton.

High School was made in 1968, but Bob Walters's words were echoed many times over by eighteen- and nineteen-year-old Marine recruits in the days immediately following the Grenada invasion. Readers of *Hunger for Memory* will not be surprised. The underside of a liberal education devoted to the development of "disembodied minds" is a vocational education whose business is the production of "mindless bodies." In Plato's Just State, where, because of their rational powers, the specially educated few will rule the many, a young man's image of himself as "only a body doing a job" is desirable. That the educational theory and practice of a democracy derives from Plato's explicitly undemocratic philosophical vision is disturbing. We are not supposed to have two classes of people, those who think and those who do not. We are not supposed to have two kinds of people, those who rule and those who obey.

The Council for Basic Education has long recommended and some people concerned with excellence in education now suggest that a liberal education at least through high school be extended to all.²⁶ For the sake of argument, let us suppose that this program can be carried out without making more acute the inequities it is meant to erase. We would then presumably have a world in which no one thinks of him- or herself as simply a body doing a job. We would, however, have a world filled with unconnected, uncaring, emotionally impoverished people. Even if it were egalitarian, it would be a sorry place in which to live. Nor would the world be better if somehow we combined Rodriguez's liberal education with a vocational one. For assuming our world were then peopled by individuals who joined "head" and "hand," reason would still be divorced from feeling and emotion, and each individual cut off from others.

The Platonic divorce of reason from feeling and emotion and of self from other is built into our prevailing theories of liberal and vocational education as well as into our very definition of the function of education. For Rodriguez, the English language was a metaphor. In the literal sense of the term he had to learn English to become an educated *American*, yet in his narrative the learning of English represents the acquisition not so much of a new natural language as of new ways of thinking, acting, and being, which he associates with the public world. Rodriguez makes it clear that the transition from Spanish to English for him represented the transition almost every child in our society makes from the "private world" of home to the "public world" of business, politics, and culture. He realizes that Spanish is not intrinsically a private language and English a public one, although his own experience made it seem this way. He knows that the larger significance of his story lies in the fact that whether English is one's first or second language, education inducts one into new activities and processes.

²⁶ See, for example, Mortimer J. Adler, *The Paideia Proposal* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1982); Ernest J. Boyer, *High School* (New York: Harper & Row, 1985).

His autobiography thus reveals that it is not just historians of educational thought and philosophers who define education as preparation solely for carrying on the productive processes of society.

Needless to say, the liberal education Rodriguez received did not fit him to carry on *all* productive processes of society. Aiming as it did at the development of a rational mind, his liberal education prepared him to be a consumer and creator of ideas, not an auto mechanic or factory worker. A vocational education—had he received one—would have prepared him to work with his hands and use procedures designed by others. Very different kinds of education, yet both kinds are designed to fit students to carry on productive, not reproductive, societal processes.⁷

Rodriguez's perception that the function of education is to induct us into the public world and its productive processes is of great consequence. Yet although this function harks back to Plato and constitutes an implicit presupposition of almost all educational thought in our own time, it has never been explicitly acknowledged and so its implications have not been traced. *Hunger of Memory* contains a wonderful account of Rodriguez's grandmother taking him to her room and telling him stories of her life. He is moved by the sounds she makes and by the message of intimacy her person transmits. The words themselves are not important to him, for, as he makes clear, he perceives the private world in which she moves—the world of child rearing and homemaking—to be one of feeling and emotion, intimacy and connection, and hence a realm of the nonrational. In contrast, he sees the public world—the world of productive processes for which his education fit him—as the realm of the rational. Feeling and emotion have no place in it, and neither do intimacy and connection. Instead, analysis, critical thinking, and self-sufficiency are the dominant values. Rodriguez's assumption that feeling and emotion, intimacy and connection are naturally related to the home and society's reproductive processes and that these qualities are irrelevant to carrying on the productive processes is commonly accepted. But then, it is to be expected that their development is ignored by education in general and by liberal education in particular. Since education is supposed to equip people for carrying on productive societal processes, from a practical standpoint would it not be foolhardy for liberal or vocational studies to foster these traits?

Only in light of the fact that education turns its back on the reproductive processes of society and the private world of the home can Rodriguez's story of alienation be properly understood. His alienation from his body will reoccur as long as we equate being an educated person with having a liberal education. His journey of isolation and divorce from his emotions will be repeated as long as we define education exclusively in relation to the productive processes of society. But the assumption of inevitability underlying *Hunger of Memory* is mistaken. Education need not separate mind from body and thought from action,

⁷ Home economics is the exception to this generalization. However, the chances that Rodriguez would have studied this subject are slight.

for it need not draw a sharp line between liberal and vocational education. More to the point, it need not separate reason from emotion and self from other. The reproductive processes *can* be brought into the educational realm, thereby overriding the theoretical and practical grounds for ignoring feeling and emotion, intimacy and connection.

If we define education in relation to *both* kinds of societal processes and then act upon our redefinition, future generations will not have to experience Rodriguez's pain. The dichotomies upon which his education rested—and which he never questions—must be questioned if we want our sons to be educated well. We must recognize, however, that to challenge the productive/reproductive dichotomy is to call for a basic rethinking of education.

TOWARD A GENDER-SENSITIVE IDEAL

It is no accident that in *Hunger of Memory* the person who is the embodiment of nurturing capacities and an ethics of care is a woman—Rodriguez's grandmother. The two kinds of societal processes, productive and reproductive, are gender-related, and so are the traits our culture associates with them. According to our cultural stereotypes, males are objective, analytical, rational, interested in ideas and things; they have no interpersonal orientation; they are not nurturant or supportive, empathetic or sensitive. Women, on the other hand, possess the traits men lack.⁸ Education is also gender-related. Our definition of the function of education makes it so. For if education is viewed as preparation for carrying on processes historically associated with males, it will inculcate traits the culture considers masculine. If the concept of education is tied by definition to the productive processes of society, our ideal of the educated person will coincide with the cultural stereotype of a male human being, and our definitions of excellence in education will embody "masculine" traits.

The conversation reclaimed here has shown that it is possible for members of one sex to possess personal traits our cultural stereotypes attribute to the other. Thus, the fact that the traits incorporated in our educational ideal are genderized in favor of males does not mean that girls and women cannot or do not acquire them. It does mean, however, that when females today embark on Rodriguez's journey of becoming educated, they experience hardships that Rodriguez did not. That our daughters do regularly travel the route taken by Rodriguez cannot be doubted. It may have been premature for Virginia Woolf to call Wollstonecraft's philosophy her "commonplace,"⁹ but in late-twentieth-century America, Wollstonecraft's proposal to extend Emile's education to Emily has been accomplished.

⁸ For discussions of our male and female stereotypes, see, for example, Alexandra G. Kaplan and Joan P. Bean, eds., *Beyond Sex-role Stereotypes* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1976); Alexandra G. Kaplan and Mary Anne Sedney, *Psychology and Sex Roles* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1980); Virginia Woolf, "Mary Wollstonecraft," reprinted in Mary Wollstonecraft, *A Vindication of the Rights of Women*, ed. Carol H. Poston (New York: Norton, 1975), p. 221.

Having pondered the fate of both Emily and the female guardians of the Just State, we have some idea of the difficulties girls and women encounter when their education is guided by ideals developed for boys and men. Because women today participate in the productive processes of society, they must acquire the traits that are functional for carrying them on. Because they are responsible also for performing at least some of the reproductive processes, they must, as Beecher argued, apply those "masculine" traits of rationality and self-government in this area, too, if these processes are to be performed well.

In claiming their education women would be well advised to reject the Platonic mold placed on Rodriguez, but in doing so they should not deny themselves access to all the traits our culture associates with males. While opting for a new ideal that joins reason to feeling and emotion and self to other, women must make such qualities as critical thinking, abstract reasoning, and self-government their own as they claim both Sophie's and Sarah's virtues for themselves.

Do girls and women today really need to claim an education in Sophie's virtues? Doesn't Nancy Chodorow's thesis that women develop nurturing capacities just because they are mothered by women imply that no education for females in an ethics of care is required? And is Carol Gilligan's finding of "a different voice" proof that at least this kind of education need not be claimed for females? The answer to these questions must be no: Chodorow's theory does not rule out education in nurturance, nor has Gilligan suggested that all females possess Sophie's virtues. The moral to be drawn from the new scholarship on women is not that females have no need for an education in nurturance but rather that an education in Sophie's virtues for females may have to proceed differently from one designed for males. Where the different voice exists it may simply need to be fostered; where it does not exist it must be constructed.

Insofar as we contemplate, as Plato did, an education for both sexes in traits and tasks associated with the productive processes of society, and insofar as we contemplate, as Gilman did, an education for both sexes in traits and tasks associated with the reproductive processes—we should not make the mistake of uncritically accepting the Identity Postulate. The educational treatment given males and females may have to be different if equivalent results are to be achieved. Before I became a participant in the conversation reclaimed here I assumed, as many people do, that the sole alternative to separate gender-bound ideals of education such as Rousseau's was one that, like Plato's, remained gender-blind. Once I entered into this conversation, however, I began to see that there is another alternative—namely, a *gender-sensitive* educational ideal.

In a society in which traits are genderized and socialization according to sex is commonplace, an educational philosophy that tries to ignore gender in the name of equality is self-defeating. Implicitly reinforcing the very stereotypes and unequal practices it claims to abhor, it makes invisible the very problems it should be addressing. So long as sex and gender are fundamental aspects of our personal experience, so long as they are deeply rooted features of our society, educational theory—and educational practice, too—must be gender-sensitive. This does not mean that we must, in the manner of Rousseau, hold up different ideals for the two sexes. It does not mean that we should agree with him that sex is

the difference that makes all the difference. What it does mean is that we must constantly be aware of the workings of sex and gender because in this historical and cultural moment, paradoxically they sometimes make a big difference even if they sometimes make no difference at all.

When education is defined solely in relation to the productive processes of society, trait genderization is seen as "a woman's problem." Once we redefine education so as to give the reproductive processes of society their due, once the virtues of nurturance and care associated with those processes are fostered in both males and females, educated men can expect to suffer for possessing traits genderized in favor of females, as educated women do now for possessing traits genderized in favor of males. This is not to say that males would be placed in the double bind educated females find themselves in now, for males would continue also to acquire traits genderized in their own favor, whereas the traits educated females must acquire today are *all* genderized in favor of males. On the other hand, since traits genderized in favor of females are considered by our culture to be lesser virtues, if virtues at all, and the societal processes with which they are associated are judged relatively unimportant, males would be placed in the position of having to acquire traits both they and their society consider inferior. Because his hands were soft Rodriguez worried that his education was making him effeminate. Imagine his anxieties if he had been educated in those supposedly feminine virtues of caring and concern and had been taught to sustain intimate relationships and to value connection.

When we claim Sophie's and Emile's virtues for both sexes, trait genderization becomes everyone's problem. Yet despite the fact that males as well as females can be made to feel abnormal if they acquire traits genderized in favor of their "opposites"—and that, as Elizabeth Janeway has pointed out, "natural" and "abnormal" are our equivalents of what being "damned" meant to our ancestors³⁰—the issues genderized traits raise for males and females differ. Educate our daughters according to an ideal incorporating "masculine" traits and, whatever damage done them, they can at least console themselves that the qualities they acquire are considered valuable and the societal processes to which these traits are attached are considered worthwhile. Educate our sons in Sophie's and Sarah's virtues and they will have no such consolation.

The existence of genderized traits makes sensitivity to gender a prerequisite of sound educational policy and so does the persistence into our own time of the value hierarchy Beecher tried to overturn. Assigning greater importance to its productive than its reproductive processes, our society places a higher value on the masculine than the feminine gender. Those who remain blind to gender will not see this disparity and consequently will not address it explicitly. Yet our policymakers must address it or the prospects of extending to our sons the education they deserve will remain slight.

What is to be done by those who believe that humanity's fate and that of the earth itself require that boys and girls, women and men, should all possess Sophie's

³⁰ Elizabeth Janeway, *Man's World, Woman's Place* (New York: Morrow, 1971), p. 96.

and Sarah's virtues as well as Emile's? One essential first step is to raise to consciousness the hidden curriculum of schooling, its denigration of women and the tasks, traits, and functions our culture associates with them.³¹ The subject matter of the liberal curriculum is drawn from disciplines of knowledge—history, literature, science—that give pride of place to male experience and achievement and to the societal processes associated with men. Implicitly, then, this curriculum is the bearer of bad news about women and the reproductive processes of society.

At college and university campuses across the country programs in women's studies thrive and projects incorporating the ever increasing body of scholarship on women into the liberal curriculum as a whole are underway. Such efforts must be undertaken at all levels of schooling, for it is too little, too late, and too elitist to postpone until the college years the revelations of the new research. Taking our cue from Plato, moreover, we must acknowledge that our schools and colleges are not our only educative—or in this instance miseducative—institutions, and we must expand our sights accordingly. Even as we work directly to change the negative messages about women and the reproductive processes of society transmitted by religious and secular, popular and high culture, we should raise to a conscious level in all students the hidden value hierarchy of society itself.

Another essential step is to build nurturing capacities and an ethics of care into the curriculum itself. I do not mean by this that we should fill up school time with courses in the 3 Cs of caring, concern, and connection. In an education that gives Sophie, Sarah, and the reproductive processes of society their due, Compassion 101a need no more be listed in a school's course offering than Objectivity 101a is now. Just as the general curricular goals of rationality and individual autonomy derive from the productive processes of society, so too the reproductive processes yield general goals. And just as rationality and autonomy are posited as goals of particular subjects, such as science, as well as of the curriculum as a whole, so nurturance and connection can become overarching educational goals as well as the goals of particular subjects.

In making nurturance, caring, concern, and connection goals of education, we must beware of replicating within the curriculum the split between the productive and reproductive processes of society. If education links nurturing capacities and the 3 Cs only to subjects such as home economics that arise out of the reproductive processes, we will lose sight of the *general* moral, social, and political significance of these traits. So long as rationality and autonomous judgment are linked exclusively with the productive processes of society, the reproductive ones will continue to be devalued. Thus, we must find ways of incorporating Sophie's and Sarah's virtues into our science, math, history, literature, and auto mechanics courses, even as we emphasize theoretical knowledge and the development of reason in the teaching of nutrition or family living.

Essential as these measures are, however, consciousness raising, the setting of new goals, and the integration of the new scholarship on women into the

curriculum are only the first steps in the transformation of the journey of becoming educated. We should not underestimate the changes to be wrought by redefining the function of education and restructuring the ideal of an educated man or woman. When the productive/reproductive dichotomy and its accompanying hierarchy of values is rejected, teaching methods, learning activities, classroom atmospheres, teacher-pupil relationships, school structures, attitudes toward education may all be affected. As a matter of fact, we cannot even assume that our definitions of the virtues of Sophie and Emile will remain the same. Combine his rationality and objectivity with her nurturance and caring and who knows—his "masculine" qualities and her "feminine" ones may both be transformed.

The details of these changes must be worked out, but I can think of few tasks as important or exciting. Too seldom do we perceive education to be the creative endeavor it really is. The subjects taught in our schools are not God-given; the way our schools are organized and children learn is by no means writ in stone; our educational ideals and our view of the function of education are not immutable truths.³² We should not delude ourselves that education can be created anew: as a social institution it has a history and traditions, and it is bound by economic and cultural constraints. Nevertheless, old habits of educational thinking can change, long-standing assumptions can be discarded, and fresh vision can improve practice. One of the unanticipated rewards of bringing women into the educational realm is that the study of education differently. The changed vision resulting from acquaintance with the education of our sons and daughters possible. If we let it, it will also enable us to discern ways to bring educational practice into tune with the full range of people's lives and with the present perils to life on earth.

From *The Schoolbome: Rethinking Schools for Changing Families* (1992)

Though we see the same world, we see it with different eyes.

Virginia Woolf, *Three Guineas*

Hunger for Memory is a success story, there is no doubt about it. When he went to school Rodriguez had his work cut out for him. This dark-skinned Mexican American from a lower-class background had to learn to see the world through the eyes of another. Whether the lenses he had to get used to wearing were provided by science or the humanities, whether they were made for distance

³² Jane Roland Martin, "Two Dogmas of Curriculum," *Synthese* 51 (1982):5-20.

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³¹ Jane Roland Martin, "What Should We Do with a Hidden Curriculum When We Find One?" *Curriculum Inquiry* 6 (1976):155-51.